For a while I have mentioned that too much of NZ political “thought” is re-hashed and often washed up ideas brought in from abroad. Both neo-liberalism and “Third Way” Labour positions were imported rather than organically generated from inside the NZ body politic and/or academia. With importation of foreign political ideas all too often comes stripping of the original ideas of any intellectual depth and nuance, particularly in the fields of public policy and political debate.
The latest example of this is ACT’s pimply-faced Ann Rand adolescent devotee’s use of libertarian thought as the basis for its policy approach. In recent years its leader, an Alfred E. Newman look-alike with serious racist and misogynist inclinations, has taken to exalting the virtues of the incestuous gnome that is currently president of Argentina, a Trump-loving mutton-chopped heavy metal grunting, formerly cross-dressing evil munchkin who takes advice from his cloned dogs, thinks orphaned children should be sold on open markets, denies that the Argentine dictatorship engaged in a “dirty war” that resulted in 30,000 deaths and countless tortured and disappeared people, believes blue-eyed people are more aesthetically and intellectually superior to brown eyed people, and who is now embroiled in a crypto currency meme fraud and a narco-trafficking scandal, all while his “chainsaw” approach to public sector reform has resulted in increased poverty, lower health and education standards, increased basic good prices like those of groceries and electricity, a hollowing out of the nation’s productive base and resultant wide-spread public unrest that is answered with indiscriminate police repression. Yep, that guy.
Which is why I say again, we are currently being governed by a crazy clown posse pushing a dumpster fire of anti-social, foreign inspired ideological garbage disguised as public management best practice. Stuff that.
But do not take this just from me. Have a look at this:
The proposed Trump bailout of Milei makes the Troubled Asset Relief Program look like petty cash, particularly when we see the utter hypocrisy underpinning it. It’s nothing short of neo-feudalism, and it may not be long before someone gets brave enough to do a Robin Hood.
Fortunately Grok is able to quickly and easily fact check your ideological rant. The idea there would not be some pain in adjusting after the evils of socialist peronism is fantasy. All the markers are that median disposable household income is substantially improving
### Net Household Income Changes After Essentials Under Milei
To address your request, I extended the analysis of household income changes (using real median per capita income from INDEC’s EPH as a proxy for household trends, scaled to an average urban household of ~3.2 members for aggregate estimates). I incorporated the effects of the Canasta Básica Alimentaria (CBA, food basket), rental costs, and energy tariffs (electricity and gas, averaged for AMBA households as a representative sample).
Data is drawn from INDEC reports for income and CBA, with rental evolution from INDEC’s IPC “Vivienda y servicios básicos” subindex (which tracks rent and utilities) and market reports for average values. Energy bills are from IIEP-UBA reports on average monthly household consumption without subsidies (focusing on luz and gas, ~70% of utilities). All values are nominal monthly ARS unless noted; real adjustments use chained CPI from INDEC (Dec 2023 = 100, cumulative ~240% to Aug 2025).
Key assumptions for net calculation:
– Household size: 3.2 members (EPH average for urban areas).
– Food cost: CBA for adult equivalent (~1 per capita proxy), scaled to household.
– Rent: Average for 2-3 room apt in AMBA (family type), ~20-25% of median household income historically.
– Energy: Average luz + gas bill for N2/N3 household (low-medium income, post-subsidy cuts).
– Net = Household income – (food + rent + energy). Changes are y/y or from baseline, in real terms where relevant to show purchasing power erosion.
Initial austerity drove sharp cost spikes (energy +1,482% nominal in gas by mid-2025), eroding net income early on. By mid-2025, income growth outpaced essentials (food +15.8% y/y Aug 2025 vs. income +87% nominal y/y Q2), yielding net gains of ~12-15% real for median households. However, low-decile households saw slower recovery due to higher essential shares (~60% of budget).
| Quarter | Median Per Capita Income (Nominal ARS) | Household Income (Nominal ARS, ~3.2 members) | Food Cost (CBA Household, Nominal ARS) | Rent Cost (Avg. AMBA Apt, Nominal ARS) | Energy Cost (Luz+Gas Household, Nominal ARS) | Net Disposable (Nominal ARS) | Real Net Change from Q4 2023 (%) |
|———|—————————————-|———————————————-|—————————————-|—————————————-|———————————————|—————————–|———————————|
| Q4 2023 (Baseline) | 114,000 | 364,800 | 224,000 (Dec: ~70k AE) | 450,000 | 25,000 | 165,800 | – |
| Q1 2024 | 140,000 | 448,000 | 280,000 (+25% m/m avg.) | 480,000 (+7%) | 40,000 (+60%) | 148,000 | -9.5% (cost shock) |
| Q2 2024 | 180,000 | 576,000 | 360,000 (+29%) | 520,000 (+8%) | 55,000 (+38%) | 141,000 | -13.0% (peak erosion) |
| Q3 2024 | 250,000 | 800,000 | 430,000 (+19%) | 580,000 (+12%) | 70,000 (+27%) | 220,000 | +32.8% (stabilizing) |
| Q4 2024 | 320,000 | 1,024,000 | 440,000 (+2%) | 650,000 (+12%) | 85,000 (+21%) | 449,000 | +170.8% (recovery) |
| Q1 2025 | 397,500 | 1,272,000 | 460,000 (+5%) | 700,000 (+8%) | 100,000 (+18%) | 512,000 | +208.9% (gains accelerate) |
| Q2 2025 | 392,000 | 1,254,400 | 514,000 (+12% y/y) | 750,000 (+7%) | 110,000 (+9%) | 380,400 | +129.5% (net up 12% real y/y) |
**Notes on Data and Calculation**:
– **Income**: Nominal medians from INDEC EPH (Q4 2024: $320k; Q2 2025: $392k); earlier quarters interpolated from trends and wage reports (+87% y/y Q2 2025). Household = per capita × 3.2. Real medians stagnated early (-11% first 4 months) but +9% by Q1 2025.
– **Food (CBA)**: Household values for type 2 (4 members, 3.09 AE) from INDEC; Dec 2023 back-calculated (~$70k AE) using +106.6% 2024 rise. Q2 2025 avg. $514k (+15.8% y/y Aug, below general CPI 23.5%). Food inflation slowed to 1-3% m/m by mid-2025.
– **Rent**: Avg. AMBA 2-amb apt from Zonaprop/Mercado Libre (~$650k Q4 2024 to $750k Q2 2025, +15% y/y); follows IPC housing (Aug 2025: +55.4% y/y, but real -30% per Milei due to deregulation boosting supply 12x). Early 2025 +6.3%.
– **Energy**: Avg. AMBA N2 household (luz $41k + gas $30k avg. Aug 2025 = $110k total, +35% y/y); from IIEP-UBA. Nominal +1,482% cumulative since Dec 2023 (gas dominant), but +9% m/m Q2 2025 as hikes tapered (1.95% Oct).
– **Net**: Simple subtraction; real change = [net / CPI index] vs. baseline, chained to Dec 2023 CPI=100. Early net fell ~13% real due to energy/rent spikes (essentials ~55% of budget). By Q2 2025, net rose +12% real y/y as income +26% outran essentials (+14% weighted avg.), adding ~$50k/month disposable per household.
**Key Insights**:
– **Short-term hit**: Q1-Q2 2024 saw net erosion (essentials +30-40% vs. income +20%), pushing ~20% of households below 50% median net.
– **Recovery**: Fiscal surplus and low inflation (1.9% Aug) boosted net +130% cumulative by Q2 2025, with middle class gaining most (Gini down to 0.424). Energy remains volatile (seasonal +50% winter), but subsidies for low-income cushioned ~30% of bills.
– **Uneven**: Informal/low-wage households (40% pop.) face higher essential shares, netting +5-8% real; gender gaps persist (women’s net +7% vs. men’s +10%).
– **Projections**: With 4% GDP growth 2025-26, net could rise another 10-15% if energy stabilizes, but global risks (e.g., commodity prices) loom.
This reveals improved affordability post-shock, with net disposable now ~23% of income (up from 18% peak low), though full pre-crisis equity may lag.
Phil,
Grok? Musk’s personal spin machine? As a source? You must be joking.
Also, did you bother to read the linked article? It does not appear that you did.
Behind your barrage of cherry picked numbers provided by manipulated Argentine sources, you omit things like child poverty rates, malnutrition and infectious disease rates, homelessness, mortality and other medical indicator data, school attendance, literacy, crime and assorted other social well-being rates. What about the stripping of state assets and private sector sell-offs at fire sale prices? What about pension devalorization? In other words, you focus only on some macroeconomic data without real social context, and that data is highly suspect to begin with (seriously, do you trust the Milei government to be honest with data? C’mon!). For you, any negative data is just the necessary consequence of “shock” because the “Peronist socialists” (whatever that is, since the Peronist movement is comprised of several factions, not all of which are Left in orientation) were to blame for everything bad in the country. BTW, are you aware that the national debt is now greater than under any Peronist government, and that the Argentine peso is basically in a free fall? And because of the mismanagement of the economy international lenders have refused further loans, which is what prompted the Trump administration to offer that USD$2 billion bailout package as a political lifeline before midterm elections later this month?
I tell you what. I say we bet a good bottle of wine on those elections. If Milei’s Libertad Avanza party wins or keeps its seats and secures its position in Congress and the provinces, which will reaffirm your view that Milei is doing well and all is copasetic in post-“shock” Argentina, then I buy. If it Milei’s party loses seats in significant numbers, then you buy. I say this even though I know that parties like the Radicals have sold their souls to Milei in order to gain short-term advantages, as have some provincial governments.But even for them, the writing may be on the wall. Or as they say in BA: “Fuera Milei!”
I fully empathise & agree with the anger which is so well expressed in your piece, Pablo, and the description of Seymour is so apt. He really is the spitting image of Alfred E Newman & deserves all the derision we can muster up.
Also; thank you for your answer to Phil’s post. My reaction is the same as yours – Grok, for goodness sake!
Grok is quoting reliable sources. Unlike yours. I find it hilarious that Grok is “bad” because it does not concur with your demonstrable left wing media bias. Median income is up and poverty is down after initial shocks. What is your evidence?
I dont know enough about the media manipulation in Argentina to sensibly bet on the outcome. The question will be whether people are feeling the changes enough yet. But a bottle of wine in support of Milei sounds like a reasonable bet. You are on.
### Poverty Trends in Argentina Since Milei (Dec 2023 – Oct 2025)
Javier Milei’s presidency began amid high poverty (41.7% in H2 2023), exacerbated by hyperinflation and fiscal imbalances. His shock therapy—peso devaluation, spending cuts, and subsidy reductions—caused an immediate surge in poverty, peaking at 52.9% in H1 2024 as real incomes eroded and essentials became unaffordable. However, as inflation plummeted from 289% annually in late 2023 to ~34% by mid-2025, and GDP rebounded (5.8% growth in Q1 2025), poverty declined sharply. By H1 2025 (latest available data, released September 2025), the rate fell to 31.6%—the lowest since 2018—affecting ~14.5 million people, down from a peak of ~24.5 million. This represents a 21.3 percentage point drop from the H1 2024 peak and a 10.1 point improvement from pre-Milei levels.
INDEC measures poverty via the Canasta Básica Total (CBT, food + non-food essentials) threshold, based on the Permanent Household Survey (EPH) covering urban areas (70% of population). Data is semi-annual; H2 2025 figures are expected in March 2026.
| Period | Poverty Rate (%) | People in Poverty (Millions, Approx.) | Change from Previous Period (pp) | Key Drivers |
|————–|——————|—————————————|———————————-|————-|
| H2 2023 (Pre-Milei Baseline) | 41.7 | ~19.3 | – | High inflation (~12% monthly), fiscal deficit. |
| H1 2024 | 52.9 | ~24.5 | +11.2 | Devaluation (+50% peso), hyperinflation (25% Dec 2023), austerity recession; sharpest rise in decades. |
| H2 2024 | 38.1 | ~17.6 | -14.8 | Inflation slowing (to 4-5% monthly), wage recovery, fiscal surplus; 1.7M children escaped poverty per UNICEF. |
| H1 2025 | 31.6 | ~14.5 | -6.5 | Sustained low inflation (1.5-2% monthly), 4.6% GDP growth projection, real income gains (+9% median); middle class expanded by 7.7M. |
**Key Insights**:
– **V-Shaped Recovery**: The initial 11.2 pp spike pushed ~5.2M more into poverty, hitting informal workers and single-parent households hardest (extreme poverty hit 18%). Recovery accelerated in H2 2024, with poverty falling below 40% for the first time since 2019, driven by tamed inflation and formal job creation (unemployment stable at ~7.6%).
– **Uneven Distribution**: Urban poverty dominates (31.6% national), but Greater Buenos Aires saw steeper drops (from 50%+ to ~28%). Inequality (Gini 0.424) eased slightly, but rural and indigenous groups lag. Gender gaps persist: women’s poverty ~35% vs. men’s 28% in H1 2025.
– **Broader Context**: Extreme poverty (indigence) mirrored the trend, falling from ~18% (H1 2024) to 6.9% (H1 2025). Despite gains, 1 in 3 Argentines remains vulnerable; public sentiment mixed, with many still “feeling the pinch” from early shocks. Projections suggest further declines to ~28% by end-2025 if growth holds.
This trajectory underscores Milei’s “short-term pain for long-term gain” strategy, with poverty now on a downward path amid macroeconomic stabilization.
Asked Grok about Indec reliability. Oooohhhh. It was teh socialists that manipulated but OECD now relies on it. OK
### Reliability of INDEC as a Source
INDEC (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos), Argentina’s official statistics agency, is widely regarded as a reliable source for economic and social data in 2024-2025, particularly under the Milei administration, though it carries a legacy of past controversies that still fuels skepticism among some observers. International organizations like the OECD, IMF, and private analysts routinely cite INDEC without qualifiers, indicating restored methodological soundness post-reforms. However, domestic critics—often from opposition circles—accuse it of potential underreporting (e.g., on poverty or inflation) to bolster government narratives, though these claims lack concrete evidence and echo historical distrust rather than proven 2025 issues.
#### Historical Context
INDEC’s credibility plummeted during the 2007-2015 Kirchner-Fernández governments, when officials (notably Guillermo Moreno, then-Secretary of Internal Trade) intervened to underreport inflation by 20-50% annually, distorting poverty and GDP figures for political gain. This led to international isolation (e.g., IMF censure in 2013) and a U.S. court ruling in 2025 ordering Argentina to pay $337 million in damages to investors misled by manipulated data. Reforms under President Macri (2016 onward) fired implicated staff, updated methodologies (e.g., new CPI basket in 2016), and aligned data with private estimates, earning IMF praise for transparency.
#### Current Status (2024-2025)
Under Milei, INDEC has maintained independence, with no documented interventions. Key evidence of reliability:
– **Alignment with Independent Data**: INDEC’s inflation (e.g., 2.1% in Sep 2025, 22% ytd) matches provincial reports and private trackers like consulting firms, countering manipulation claims. Methodological updates, like a delayed new CPI weighting system (approved Apr 2025), aim to reflect modern consumption (e.g., higher tech/services share), not obscure trends.
– **International Endorsement**: The OECD’s 2025 Economic Survey uses INDEC data for fiscal and growth analysis without caveats, noting stabilization from 2024 austerity. Deloitte (Nov 2024) and FocusEconomics (Apr 2025) cite it for sector growth and inflation forecasts. The IMF’s Data Quality Assessment Framework (DQAF) lists INDEC as the core of Argentina’s statistical system, with high scores in dissemination and integrity since 2016 evaluations (no 2025 downgrade).
– **Domestic Usage**: Even critical outlets like Buenos Aires Times report INDEC’s poverty drop (31.6% H1 2025) factually, though noting public doubt. Statista and Reddit discussions highlight its role as the go-to source, with users verifying via rubro-by-rubro breakdowns.
#### Criticisms and Caveats
Skepticism persists, especially on X (formerly Twitter), where users accuse Milei of “gross manipulation” on poverty thresholds (e.g., claiming $370k/month isn’t poor ignores real affordability). These echo Kirchner-era gripes but flip the narrative—opposition now alleges understating to claim success (e.g., 21 pp poverty fall). However, no scandals emerged in 2024-2025; accusations tie to broader “cracks” in Milei’s image from unrelated corruption probes. Outdated parameters (e.g., 2004 weights) are a valid methodological critique, but INDEC is addressing them.
In summary, INDEC is reliable for analytical purposes today—its data drives global forecasts and holds up to scrutiny—but cross-verify with private sources (e.g., UTDT or FIEL) for nuance, given Argentina’s politicized stats history. This balance ensures robust, unbiased insights.
Phil,
Lets do the bet. At a cursory glance your stats look as if they are legit, but Milei’s corrupt manipulation of macroeconomic data is so apparent that even outlets like the Economist are questioning them. And do not forget investor reluctance to put capital into the country in light of IMF/World Bank refusal to extend bridge loans to Milei’s government (the OpenAI investment pledge does buck that trend, I will grant you that).
Amid the never-ending economic word salad, you offer a telling remark: after all of the hardship caused by the shocks, etc. in 2025 Argentina achieved the lowest inflation levels since 2018. Guess who was inn power then? Yup, the Peronist s socialists. And they achieved that without resorting to shick therapy. Go figure.
BTW, your poverty figures are laughable and must have been collected in the rich northern suburbs of BA. The real figure is closer to 60% nation-wide. Try looking at CEPAL data as an alternative to the “official story.”
Di,
I normally would not refer to a politician’s appearance and realise that Seymour’s face is more angular than Alfred’s rotund conformation, but his reprehensible character and policies make him an irresistible target. Same as Shane Jones, without the (as far as we know) onanistic tendencies.
Exactly so!
I have a very unfortunate reaction whenever I see & hear Shane Jones. It’s a vision of him in a hotel room that I cannot unsee.