Circumstance, Context and Consequence of New Zealand’s first combat death in Afghanistan.*

datePosted on 20:02, August 5th, 2010 by Pablo

Events in Afghanistan this week prompted me to write on them as well as their implications. This is the full version, which did not appear in the mainstream press.

Until this week the 140-troop NZDF mission in support of the Provincial Reconstruction team (PRT) in Afghanistan’s Bamiyan province was considered the “softer” of the two NZDF deployments in that country. Given their status as elite combat troops, the 2001-05 and post-2009 NZSAS missions in Afghanistan have received more attention as the presumably “hard” edge of New Zealand’s military contribution to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) charged with bringing peace and stability to that failed state. The death of Lieutenant Timothy O’Donnell has changed that view.

Lieutenant O’Donnell was killed while on routine patrol northeast of the city of Bamiyan. NZDF patrols are undertaken daily as part of the PRT’s responsibilities, which are to provide security and undertake civil reconstruction and nation-building projects such as the construction of schools, roads, medical clinics (including the combat medics to staff them), water treatment facilities and other infrastructure required for local governance to operate efficiently. Although Bamiyan province is largely populated by the non-Pashtun ethnic Hazaras (a Shiia minority elsewhere in Afghanistan) who are generally friendly to ISAF forces because they were discriminated against under Taliban rule, the Taliban presence, although not as dominant as in Helmand or Kandahar provinces, has remained as an ever-present threat that has increased over the last two years. In fact, the ambush in which Lieutenant O’Donnell died was preceded by at least three similar attacks in the last 14 months, all using the same combination of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and small arms fire.

Despite the previous attacks, the NZDF did not vary its operational routine and continued to use three or four vehicle convoys for its patrols along well-established routes. The vehicles in question were US-provided reinforced Toyota Hiluxes and armed “uparmoured” Humvees in which electronic counter-measures (ECM) were reportedly used to thwart electronic pulse-detonated IEDs (UPDATE: official details are sketchy as to whether the convoy was a mix of vehicles or all of one or the other, but non official reports suggest that Hiluxes have not been used on those patrols for 18 months and the vehicles in question were all “uparmoured” Humvees). Although state of the art, such ECMs cannot prevent a command wire or pressure plate detonated IED (especially at night), one of which was apparently used in this latest attack.

In previous instances the Hiluxes suffered minor damages in IED attacks, but this time the IED was much more powerful. No NZDF Light Armoured Vehicles (LAVIIs), out of an inventory of 106, were provided to the NZDF/Bamiyan PRT because their characteristics were deemed unsuitable for the Bamiyan AOR because most of it is single track dirt paths (even though the NZSAS has two available for operational duty in Kabul and the US has deployed ECM-equipped and reinforced armoured Stryker (the name it gives to the LAVs) units in the Afghan theater of operations). Although very agile in rough terrain (especially in its 6×6 version), the 321-strong NZDF Pinzgauer Military Utility Vehicle (MUV) fleet was not requisitioned in Bamiyan even though it fulfills the NZDF Light Operational Vehicle (LOV) role, most likely because even in its “uparmoured” version it remains vulnerable to combined small arms assaults and is underpowered when traversing steep terrain in its uparmoured version.  Unlike in previous instances, air cover was not able to respond to the latest attack due to bad weather conditions in the area. The official line is that the patrol was able to find cover and establish a defensive position while returning fire, leading to a prolonged firefight before the assailants were repelled. In all likelihood given Taliban  hit and run tactics, the actual firefight was quite short and most of the damage to men and machines was done by the IED rather than the ensuing exchange of small arms fire. Whatever the exact circumstances, this combination of contributing factors proved to be lethal for Lt. O’Donnell and injurious to his comrades.

The ISAF strategy in Afghanistan is a macrocosmic reflection of what the PRT mission is in Bamiyan. It conducts counter-insurgency operations against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in order to physically secure the country and prevent the re-establishment of both Taliban rule and al-Qaeda safe havens and training camps within it. In parallel, it attempts to train Afghan security forces and provide the infrastructural conditions so as to consolidate the control of the Western-backed Karzai regime centred in Kabul. As with the Bamiyan PRT, success in the first task is deemed necessary for success with the latter two.

In many ways the death of a Kiwi soldier was inevitable given the balance of the conflict. ISAF has not succeeded in routing the Taliban even if it has denied them and their al-Qaeda allies much territory and space for maneuver. Its nation-building efforts have been thwarted by endemic corruption by the Karzai regime and a motley assortment of tribal warlords and drug barons. For all its rhetorical commitment to supporting the ISAF mission from its side of the border, Pakistan remains a suspect ally, if not a covert adversary in the conflict. Given the announced timetable for a US troop drawdown and ISAF withdrawal beginning in July 2011, the Taliban have increased their attacks in order to raise the costs to ISAF, undermine public support for the mission amongst coalition partners (such as the Dutch, who have just exited the theater), and thereby hasten the inevitable. In fact, both ISAF commander General David Petraeus as well as US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Millan have said that ISAF casualties will increase over the next months as coalition forces push into Taliban strongholds in a final effort to degrade its ability to mount effective guerrilla operations against Afghanistan police, Army and ISAF targets.

However, true to form, the Taliban have responded with a classic guerrilla tactic when confronted with superior military forces: they employ a “balloon” strategy whereby they retreat from areas in which they are being squeezed by superior ISAF forces and regroup in areas in which the ISAF presence is relatively thin on the ground. The key to their success is to respond to mass with maneuver, avoiding the friction of large conventional forces via fluidity of movement towards areas in which the odds are in their favour. In other words, the Taliban like to” hit ‘em where they ain’t.”

One such area is Bamiyan, which means that there is nothing soft about the NZDF/PRT role there. The hazards are not just military. Given the Taliban resurgence and the inevitable withdrawal of ISAF forces, it is prudent and rational for the Hazaras (as much as all other tribal groups throughout the country) to begin to look the other way when it comes to Taliban movements in Bamiyan, if not cooperate with or simply accommodate the insurgents. After all, the Taliban will be a armed and political presence long after the ISAF forces are scaled back or gone. That makes the NZDF position in the Bamiyan PRT harder to maintain the closer it approaches to the announced ISAF withdrawal date. In plain terms, without reinforcement the NZDF/PRT position becomes more tenuous given the shift in local loyalties as the withdrawal deadline approaches, and tenuous in military terms means a high probability of increased casualties as the adversary grows in confidence and receives more support or acquiescence from the local population.

The National government has reaffirmed its commitment to the Bamiyan PRT mission through September 2011 and is considering extending thr NZSAS deployment past its scheduled March 2011 end date. But the possibility of further fatalities now haunts its commitment. The larger question is whether the New Zealand public has the stomach to support continuing NZDF participation in the Afghan conflict in the face of increased casualties. That will be a critical juncture in New Zealand foreign relations, because public support is essential to maintaining the political will to continue fighting—and dying—in support of broadly defined foreign policy objectives. Since the measure of a military commitment is ultimately taken in blood, it behooves New Zealand’s political leadership to make a strong case as to why Kiwi lives are worth sacrificing in a seemingly futile conflict in far off place that appears, on the face of things, to have little strategic value to core New Zealand interests. It is also incumbent upon the opponents of the NZDF deployment to Afghanistan to make an equally convincing case as to why Kiwi lives should not be risked in Afghanistan in pursuit of vanity, favour, treasure or ephereal benefit.

Out of that debate a true public consensus can be formed that gives clear direction to the government’s approach to the ISAF commitment in the year leading up to general elections.

*A short version of this essay was published in the New Zealand Herald on August 5, 2010 under the title “Death makes it clear Bamiyan not “soft” option.”

11 Responses to “Circumstance, Context and Consequence of New Zealand’s first combat death in Afghanistan.*”

  1. [...] This post was mentioned on Twitter by NZ Accommodation, Lew. Lew said: Background to and implications of the death of Lt O'Donnell, by Paul Buchanan: http://bit.ly/bR2PMz In brief: NZ needs to discuss the issue. [...]

  2. Old Phart on August 6th, 2010 at 01:13

    I wonder how much enthusiasm there would be on the part of the ISAF if NZ Govt were to insist on re-deploying some of our SAS to Bamyian so they could “ride shotgun” to our PRT? And how keen would the SAS itself be? I imagine they might prefer the more glamorous – albeit probably more dangerous – surroundings of Kabul.

  3. Hugh on August 6th, 2010 at 02:01

    If the death of an NZ soldier was inevitable why have you, in your voluminous number of articles on the Kiwi presence in Afghanistan, never predicted it outside of retrospect?

  4. Pablo on August 6th, 2010 at 11:53

    Hugh:

    Two things. 1) I have alluded to the risks in a number of fora a number of times; 2) just because one knows that bad news is in all probability on its way does not mean that one should publicly engage in worst case predictions. That would be seen as alarmist and politically motivated, if not contrary to troop morale, mean-spirited, unpatriotic and the like.

    The hard fact is that it has been evident in my writing all along what the risks of the Afghan mission were, which did not have to be spelled out in elementary fashion for readers to comprehend.

  5. Hugh on August 6th, 2010 at 16:45

    So deaths are inevitable, but they’re also limited to worst case scenarios? Got it.

  6. Pablo on August 6th, 2010 at 16:55

    Hugh:

    Being pedantic might score you brownie points in Japan but here it just reveals you to be a twit. Besides, your basic comprehension skills are clearly suspect. I specifically wrote that Lt. O’Donnell’s death was inevitable “given the balance of the conflict,” and then go on to explain at length why the conflict has increased the odds against NZDF soldiers.

    Even had I not used the qualifying remarks that you conveniently neglect to mention, your lack of cognitive skills extends further: Death is inevitable for us all, and unless one is bent on martyrdom, it is most definitely a worst case scenario when it occurs as a result of exposure to high explosives, hot lead or some other unnatural cause. No need, then, to belabour the obvious (to all except you, apparently).

  7. Hugh on August 6th, 2010 at 19:55

    Yeaaaa I think I’m done here, Pablo.

  8. SapperK9 on August 6th, 2010 at 20:08

    Hi Lux and Hummer!

    I don’t friggin believe it!? Over 40 years ago Australia learned from its Vietnam experience and developed the belly and sponson armour kit for the M113A1 because of road bombs/booby traps (as they were then called).

    We went into AStan with Bushmaster and APC/LRV. So far effective. Yanks went in with their bloody beach buggies, killed hundreds of their men because of this lame brained decision. Now, to use a Hummer “outside the wire” for the US requires the authority of a full Colonel or above. Clearly, the Kiwi Squaddie is worth less than the US Grunt?

    I do not believe that NZ deployed with utes and beach buggies? Do you have any officers or politicians who can walk and chew gum simultaneously? Because, in my opinion, the decision to use any vehicle not “designed” to take a hit, is the decision of the killer, Taliban or Kiwi, or both.

    Do you have public inquests for your KIA like the Poms, because Aust do not! Scared of showing our frail military petticoats in public.

    Sad, very sad, as is any unnecessary death on active service…

  9. Pablo on August 6th, 2010 at 20:26

    SapperK9:

    Thanks for the insight. There is much irony in what you write, as the NZDF replaced their M113 fleet with the (often non-deployable, some say virtually useless off pavement) LAVs.

    My understanding is that the NZDF/Bamiyan PRT initially used the Hilux’s with jury-rigged armour, then were loaned the Humvees by the US after they suffered damage (at least one was totaled) in previous attacks. The Humvees are supposed to be the “uparmoured” version, but do not have the V-shaped underarmour that would deflect an IED blast (nor, for that matter, do the LAVs). Although there are 6×6 Pinzgaeurs in the NZDF inventory they were also deemed unsuitable for the AOR (presumably because even armoured versions are, as I mentioned in the post, vulnerable to combined small arms attack).

    As far as I know there are no public inquests into NZDF KIAs, nor do I expect one to be held in this case (although PM Key has said that he welcomes one).

    As for officers and politicians chewing gum and walking simultaneously, check this out: http://www.kiwipolitico.com/2010/03/the-limitations-of-n-8-wire-and-how-the-politicalpolicy-talent-bench-is-so-thin/

  10. SapperK9 on August 6th, 2010 at 23:51

    Yes Pablo,

    The Hummers must have come cheeep, the US put some 60,000 into the MEAO and they are declared unsafe at any speed – surprise – at last! You can’t “up armour” anything nowadays if it don’t have the boat shaped hull. The Yanks knew this in the 60s when they made the bloody M60, and here we and they are with flat bottom still? Oz got it right with the Bushmaster which has been quite successful in protecting its occupants.

    You seem to suffer a similar issue to Oz in the equipping area. Often in our armies you’d think 1914-18 never happened and the machine gun and high explosive were a novelty to the battlefield. Never helped by senior officers without balls to speak out. Which is where the Poms now appear well off, some five of their Battlegroup commanders have resigned after service in the MEAO, and their CGS questioned both sides of politics in the media before the recent election. Balls on real officers. We (ANZAC) have a very dated purview of the Brit forces, illustrating clearly our level of ignorance.

    You don’t have to look far for examples of real equipping in the Middle East, Israel says it all. Have a look at their Namer APC, and their Iron Fist active defence systems, and they work detection dogs on ops from under cover and in armour from up to two miles away!

    There can be no excuse for any learning curve, let alone “reason”…

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