Tag Archives: GCSB

Gilmore’s ghosts

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I disagree with Pablo’s post about media treatment of the Aaron Gilmore saga — but I only disagree a little. In my view the Gilmore case is “stuff that really matters”, but I do agree with Pablo that most of the coverage of it isn’t getting to the “stuff that really matters” elements of the case nearly well enough, and that it is displacing coverage of more crucial issues from the agenda. All the stories Pablo mentions are worthy of much more, and more in-depth reporting than they have received. Two other points Pablo makes are particularly valuable — that “blood in the water is not akin to developing real critiques of the way power is exercised”, and that “the problem of Gilmore’s unwillingness to resign stems not from MMP but from political party charters regarding their lists in an MMP environment.”

The Gilmore story is important, as are those others — but the coverage is so individuated to him that it makes the issues seem trivial, because ultimately, if you reduce the story to that of a drunken backbencher, it is. At the heart of the Gilmore saga is the abuse of power, and the problem is that the coverage is about Aaron Gilmore’s attempted abuse of his own power, not about a culture within the National Party and the government where the abuse of power is not merely acceptable, but routine and expected.

The deep questions — how such a megalomaniac got into an electable position on a party list; who, having been apprised of these born-to-rule tendencies after previous incidents of this sort, approved his position; and the implications of this for the health of our democracy — these are important questions. They haven’t really been asked, or answered, though Matthew Hooton, of all people, had a go at it early on.

The John Key National-led government has a lot of form for bad and self-serving appointments, and for the abuse of power. This has presented opportunities for the opposition to frame them as serial cronyists, which they haven’t been able to take. (I wrote a couple of things about this in the first term — it’s not new). And it’s still going: to hear locals tell it, how Gerry Brownlee and CERA are treating Eastern Christchurch isn’t all that different in its principles to how Aaron Gilmore treats waiters and public servants. (The difference is that they have real power.) Recent appointments on the basis of loyalty or malleability at the expense of quality or expertise include Catherine Isaac to implement charter schools, Ian Fletcher as head of the GCSB and Dame Susan Devoy as race relations commissioner.

This is a government which has been particularly unconcerned with even the appearance of due process, and this should be acknowledged in every story on this topic. There’s no credible argument they hadn’t done due diligence on Aaron Gilmore — he was already in Parliament once. Why do they appoint people like this, and why do they get away with it?

The hard truth is that political parties will overlook an awful lot if there’s a financial or electoral advantage to doing so, just as corporations will. Militaries will overlook almost literally anything, up to and including the mass murder of civilians. This is true of the “nice” guys as well as the nasty ones — the Obama administration’s continuing support of Guantanamo Bay and its increasing use of UAVs are two clear examples of this. Apple products are manufactured by the notoriously exploitative Foxconn (Apple is far from alone in this, but we’re supposed to think Apple is somehow better than others). For a recent local example, see the Labour Party’s dogged defence of Taito Phillip Field, whose abuse of vulnerable workers cut directly against everything a Labour party ought to stand for. There are many more.

The fundamental reason this sort of behaviour is endemic is that we — as voters, or in the corporate case, as consumers — reward it with our votes, or our wallets, or both. Parties and companies that eschew these methods tend to lose to those who accept them as an ethical cost of doing business because while we are happy to get outraged, when the chips are really down, we don’t actually care that much about this sort of thing. It doesn’t really change our behaviour.

The danger is that people start caring, and more importantly, start remembering, and changing their behaviour. If the Aaron Gilmore affair haunts the National party — and the other parties — such that they see a strong downside risk to appointing cronies, selecting megalomaniacs for their lists, and generally swaggering around as if they own the place, we’ll all be better off. If parties are forced to accept responsibility for their bad decisions, and as a consequence to select better people and implement better systems of accountability and conduct, cultures of power-abuse will abate. Incidentally, this is why I don’t favour a rule that allows parties to eject rogue MPs from Parliament* — the Nats bought Aaron Gilmore, they own him. We should judge the entire party by his actions.

But for this sort of change to occur, we need media coverage to develop those real critiques of the exercise of power, rather than critiques of an obnoxious individual who is ultimately just a product of larger cultural systems. That would make this sort of wall-to-wall coverage worthwhile.

L

* Though I still believe any credible political leader should be resourceful enough to find ways to persuade rogue MPs to resign.

Journalistic license.

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Over the years I have been repeatedly misidentified by NZ media types and others in the public domain as to what I am or have been. I have been called a Middle East expert, White House aide, CIA agent, Zionist agent, 9/11 conspirator, Nazi war criminal, anti-Muslim racist, security expert and assorted other niceties. The trouble with these characterizations is that they are all wrong. Worse yet, some of them have invited unwanted and unpleasant personal attention.

Imagine then my dismay to see Andrea Vance of Fairfax identify me as a “former US spy” in an article about the GCSB report. How did she get that label? I certainly made no such claim so it is difficult to understand why she felt that she could publish such a characterization, especially since it carries in some minds a very negative connotation. Shame on her.

The reality is that I simply am a former defense policy analyst and consultant to US security agencies who alternated government service with academia. My background is in international relations and comparative politics with emphasis on unconventional warfare, intelligence analysis, Latin American politics, regime dynamics and labor relations. Lots of field and documentary research, but no spying involved.

Bonus question: readers are invited to suggest who might be on the list of 88 people spied on by the GCSB. I imagine that the Urewera 18 were and that some in the NZ Muslim community may continue to be. The Zaoui defense team might be a good bet. Environmental, animal and anti-FTA activists could be targets. John Minto and Valerie Morse believe that they have been (Val, of course, was part of the Urewera crowd). Any other suggestions?

 

Media Link: More GCSB weirdness.

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I was interviewed on Radio NZ about the controversy surrounding the appointment of Ian Fletcher as GCSB director. I had to leave out a number of important points like the need for objectivity and political neutrality in intelligence operations, or how the PM could have had a surrogate reach out to Fletcher rather than get personally involved in his selection. Otherwise, the gist is here.

On the need for intelligence accountability and oversight reform.

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One thing has become clear after the revelations of multiple New Zealand intelligence agency failures, malfeasance and incompetence over the past few years. That is what happens when there is no effective oversight on, or accountability by those agencies. As things stand the Prime Minster is the sole oversight on New Zealand’s intelligence community. The parliamentary intelligence and security committee is a toothless wonder that gets semi-regular general briefings on intelligence matters (at a rate of less than once a month), and the inspector general (IG) of intelligence–the person who is supposed to independently investigate the actions of the intelligence community–is currently a geriatric former judge who has the equivalent of a .5 full time employee and whose office and resources are provided by the agencies he is supposed to independently assess. His predecessor, another retired judge, resigned under a cloud brought about by the Ahmed Zaoui political asylum  case, where the Security Intelligence Services (SIS)  was shown to have clearly manipulated analysis of intelligence flows derived from foreign partners and the IG demonstrated bias in favor of  the SIS version  of events prior to releasing his findings.

Add to that the fact that the IG has limited powers of investigation and a parliamentary committee that cannot be told about operational matters and has no powers to subpoena or authority to force testimony under oath, and what you have is a recipe for institutional “stretch:” the tendency of institutions to exceed and play loose with the rules, laws and regulations governing their charter in the absence of effective oversight and accountability. That has become glaring apparent in recent weeks.

The problem is somewhat mitigated when the Prime Minister is a hands-on type of manager who is knowledgeable about intelligence matters, to include methods of collection and analysis. Although it raises the possibility of PM misuse of intelligence flows for political purposes, it does have the merit of forcing intelligence officials to be accountable to someone. However, if the PM is disinterested, ignorant or laissez-faire in managerial approach to intelligence matters, then the possibility of intelligence agency institutional stretch becomes quite real, as we have now seen.

Given the revelations about the GCSB and prior instances of SIS “stretch,” the time is now perfect for a reform of the intelligence oversight apparatus. Although the PM can and should remain as the minister for intelligence and security, the parliamentary committee needs to be granted effective and binding oversight authority that includes powers to investigate operational issues and force intelligence agency officials of all ranks  to respond under oath to questions about the how, when and why of specific intelligence matters. Likewise, the Inspector General’s position needs to be expanded into a three person panel that includes a mix of people with experience in handling sensitive information and knowledge of how intelligence collection and analysis works, and who answer to and are resourced by parliament rather than the PM and SIS, respectively.

Unchecked executive oversight of intelligence agencies is prone to what might be called the authoritarian tendency (by which elected executives assume quasi-dictatorial powers of managerial control), and is in fact the mark of many authoritarian regimes. This avoids the system of checks and balances that is not only a hallmark of democratic political systems, but of their institutional component as well. The issue, as the intelligence community well knows, is about triangulation: there needs to be at least three independent (if overlapped) sources of critical institutional scrutiny for information or oversight to be validated (which are manifest in policy or administrative decisions).

That system of institutional checks and balances is what provides oversight and promotes accountability within public bureaucracies as a whole. Such accountability is horizontal–between different public agencies such as the judiciary and security apparatus–as well as vertical (where public agencies answer to political authorities separated into legislative and executive components). The institutionalized oversight aggregate mitigates against public agency stretch and political manipulation.

Having one individual, whatever his or her persuasion with regard to issues of intelligence collection, analysis and political impact (something driven by the political context of the moment, including  the relationship between government and opposition and the  personal and partisan implications of any given decision regarding security and intelligence) is, in a democracy, antithetical. In mature democracies policy decisions are not individualized; they are institutionalized and subject to effective oversight.

This is simply a matter of democratic good practice. Effective, independent oversight not only keeps intelligence agencies honest and prevents institutional stretch. It reassure the voting public that the larger common interest, rather than narrow political, diplomatic or corporate concerns, are served by the intelligence and security agencies charged with defending the commonweal.

More questions about the Dotcom spying case.

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It turns out that the Prime Minister was briefed about the Dotcom surveillance by the GCSB in February 2012, not in September 2012 as Mr. Key has previously asserted. It also turns out that the eavesdropping began before the late 2011 timeframe offered by the government and repeated in Inspector General Paul Neazor’s report on the unlawful nature of the GCSB’s involvement n the Dotcom case. Since 2009, shortly after National assumed government, there have been at least three other cases involving the GCSB that may be of dubious legality. The official story admits that the legal advice given to the Police and the GCSB with regards to Dotcom’s residency status was wrong. Apparently neither the Police or GCSB checked with Immigration, Customs or other agencies about the issue (or if they did, they received either erroneous advice or ignored the correct advice given).

Mr. Key says that the briefing in February 2012 was about the general roles and capabilities of the GCSB, and that Mr. Dotcom’s photo came up as part of a laptop slide show presentation. That is curious. One would assume that Mr. Key would have received such a briefing as part of the transition to and early days of his first government, and that he would consequently have an idea of GCSB functions well before February 2012. It would be astounding if no such briefing took place during his first term as Prime Minister, and it would be only slightly less astounding if he required a remedial or follow-up briefing in February 2012, which just happened to be less than three weeks after the Dotcom raids.

More plausible would be that the briefing in February 2012, as the government returned to business after the summer holidays, was a status report on ongoing GCSB operations. One would presume that the slide show presentation was done to bullet point the main thrust of those operations as well as the targets and methods involved. The Dotcom case would have been one of them.

The question begs as to whether not only is the Prime Minister’s memory faulty, but whether he is competent on matters of security and intelligence. If he needs a remedial general brief about the GCSB role and functions and/or cannot distinguish between an operational status update and a general brief after nearly four years in office, then he clearly is not up to the task of providing effective oversight of the intelligence apparatus. Nor, it would seem, is his cabinet, which presumably would have prepped him on the nature of the visit to the GCSB headquarters in February 2012 and provided him with detailed questions on the operations in question. One of them might have been with regard to Mr. Dotcom’s residency status and the legality of GCSB surveillance in that case.

It would seem that, to paraphrase an observation about Sarah Palin, he has a singular intellectual disinterest in matters of security and intelligence, and that disinterest is shared by his closest advisors. Contrast that with his real interest in tourism (of which he is minister), the foreign film industry (for which his government changed NZ law in order to accommodate the conditions demanded by one foreign investor) and privatization and asset sales schemes of various sorts.

The bottom line is that John Key is to intelligence oversight what the captain of the Costa Concordia is to maritime safety–both asleep or otherwise engaged while in command.

The Dotcom case is the unhappy gift that keeps on giving. The media and the opposition are peeling away the layers of obfuscation that make up the bulk of the government’s version of the story. There is surely more unflattering revelations to come.

Fundamental issues of accountability and oversight have been raised by the Dotcom case, not only with regard to the substance of the charges against him and the way in which the Police, Crown and GCSB conducted themselves, but with regard to the general conduct of New Zealand intelligence agencies (the SIS has had its own share of embarrassments in that respect).

With a parliamentary security and intelligence committee devoid of effective oversight powers, an Inspector General of Intelligence whose independence and authority are tightly circumscribed and a prime minister who is either incompetent or disinterested in security and intelligence matters, or whose managerial style is to allow sensitive government bureaucracies to operate with near total independence wedded to an absence of institutional accountability (which can be vertical or horizontal, with both being needed for effective democratic oversight of intelligence and security agencies), the Dotcom case may only be the tip of the iceberg when it comes to state agencies playing loose with the law.

That matters only because adherence to the rule of law is considered to be one fundamental measure of the quality of democracy. The core of that measure is that the State adhere to the law as much if not more than its citizens. Given the revelations in the Dotcom case, which follow on other instances of intelligence agency malfeasance (e.g. the Zaoui beat-up), New Zealand has found itself sorely wanting.

 

Media Link: The GCSB and the Dotcom case

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I was interviewed by the RNZ Nine to Noon program on the subject of the GCSB involvement in the Kim Dotcom case. Nicky Hagar followed me. Although it now has been confirmed that the Police misled the GCSB as to the residency status of Dotcom and his associates, the dates of the awarding of residency status to at least some of the group, including Mr. Dotcom, is somewhat nebulous in the MSM reporting.  This is being clarified as the media dig into the issue, but my initial comments before yesterday’s revelations might be of interest to some. They are here.

NZ wiki cable number 2.

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This one is arguably better than the last. I say “better” simply because it speaks to intelligence and security issues in the main rather than broader foreign policy or NZ leaderships characteristics, and names key players in the NZ security apparatus (it should be noted that although it is illegal to name various intelligence personnel in NZ public fora, this was a classified internal US government document so the legal restrictions do not apply. Now the document is a matter of public record so the cat is out of the bag, so to speak).
In any event, this one is a veritable gold mine in places. Again, note the distribution list, and thanks to Selwyn Manning and Scoop for doing the original data mining.

08WELLINGTON356
Date: 10/24/2008
175015,10/24/2008 1:29,08WELLINGTON356,Embassy Wellington,SECRET//NOFORN,,VZCZCXYZ0001OO RUEHWEBDE RUEHWL #0356/01 2980129ZNY SSSSS ZZHO 240129Z OCT 08FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTONTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5491INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0442RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 5291RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0069RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0209RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0192RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0336RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0309RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0725RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYRUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYRHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITYRHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY,”S E C R E T WELLINGTON 000356 NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/ANP AND INR/FO E.O. 12958: DECL:

10/23/2018 TAGS: PINR, PREL, NZ SUBJECT: A/S FORT’S OCTOBER 9-10 VISIT TO NEW ZEALAND Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Margaret B. McKean; Reason 1.4 (b), ( c), (d) 1. (C) Summary. During an October 9-10 visit to New Zealand, INR A/S Randall Fort met with members of the External Assessments Bureau (EAB), the Chief Executive of the Prime Minister and Cabinet’s Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Deputy Secretary Caroline Forsyth, and officials with New Zealand’s Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB). GNZ officials praised USG efforts to improve intelligence sharing, particularly with respect to imagery. GNZ interlocutors acknowledged that New Zealand gains enormous benefits from being part of the Five Eyes intelligence community. A/S Fort’s message focused on the increasing sophistication of commercial search engines and the growing number of open source analyses available to policymakers. In the future, the intelligence community must find ways to differentiate their products and provide value added to policy makers, argued A/S Fort. He also discussed the issues surrounding cyberspace and national security. Key issues for GNZ officials centered on the recent Georgia/Russia conflict, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan/Afghanistan, North Korea and the Pacific region. End Summary. Security of Public Sector Computers is Key Concern ——————————————— —– 2. (C) INR Assistant Secretary Fort visited New Zealand on October 910, accompanied by other INR staff. Meetings with GNZ officials included calls on Gregory Baughen, head of New Zealand’s External Assessments Bureau (EAB), working sessions with EAB officials, a meeting with Bruce Miller, Deputy Director of New Zealand’s GCSB, and a a call on Michael McBurney, Deputy Director of New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS). Discussions with EAB working level staff and analysts from other government

offices focused on the recent Russia/Georgia conflict, North Korea and northeast Asia, China, Iran/Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Pacific region. 3. (S/NF) During his visit, Fort called on Chief Executive of the Department for Cabinet and Prime Minister’s Office, Maarten Wevers, who manages a staff of 120, including Domestic and External Security groups, the PM’s policy group, and Wevers also oversees New Zealand’s intelligence committee. Wevers likened his Department to the National Security Council in terms of breadth of coverage and responsibilities. He noted that EAB’s operations are highly compartmentalized and EAB reports are tightly held within Cabinet, with few Ministers seeing them. He explained that New Zealand’s contribution to the Five Eyes intelligence community consists of two monitoring stations; one in the northern end of the south island, and the other on the north island near Wellington. Wevers offered that the GNZ recognizes that it is a “”enormous beneficiary”” of the Five Eyes community and lauded the good bilateral relations on intelligence sharing, including recent strides in imagery sharing. He added that New Zealand was “”well past the military issues”” of the past. A/S Fort hoped the additional access would prove useful to New Zealand; the amount of information and management of the information can be a challenge. Wevers commented that intelligence and assessments may mean something different to New Zealand than to other Five Eyes partners. Often there are significant differences with Australia, he added, as New Zealand is a more Pacific country than Australia and the latter is not always attuned to Pacific developments. 4. (C) A/S Fort spoke about the challenges for intelligence analysts posed by the rapid growth of commercially available analytic services outside government and the sophistication of search engines such as Google and Yahoo. The information needed by policymakers is increasingly available outside government,

and the size of outside companies or groups is not a factor. Smaller can be very nimble; the quality of the analysis is key and the intelligence community must increasingly look to match outside services and provide additional value added to remain relevant, affirmed the A/S. 5. (C) Fort turned to issues involving cyberspace and the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), which will begin with the Five Eyes and then move to NATO countries. Security is part of the issue, but the A/S also stressed the relevance to finance and defense. Even small countries can benefit with a relatively small contribution towards equipment and personnel. Regarding deterrence, he mentioned that there are analogues to nuclear deterrence but the international community is only beginning to think about cyber threats in similar fashion. Wevers noted that the GNZ is seized with the issue of cybersecurity, and f is working with the PM’s Department to protect the public sector computer system and analyze the range of risks. 6. (C) In discussing the Pacific and Chinese activities in the region, Wevers said that China has recognized that their competition with Taiwan is not helpful, but their foreign affairs officials are not always aware of what others in the Chinese government are doing in the region. Venezuela and Cuba are now coming into the Pacific, and Wevers likened their interest to that of the Russians in the past. A/S Fort mentioned that the backtracking of democracy in the broader Pacific region (Fiji, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia) was a Washington concern. The region is more fragile today than 10 years ago, he opined, and urged a coordinated approach by the stronger and healthier democracies. Wevers offered that APEC remains an important regional mechanism and the East Asia Summit, which includes India, is another good venue for raising issues. Wevers added that China is only now realizing the very significant law and order problem

within China, as people are making money illicitly without any sense of the rule of law. The metamphetamine problem in the region can be traced to China, continued Wevers, and the precursor chemicals are coming into New Zealand and other countries in large containers that are difficult to stop. Meeting with MFAT Deputy Secretary Caroline Forsyth ——————————————— —— 7. (S/NF) DepSec Forsyth welcomed A/S Fort’s visit, stating that the GNZ values its contacts with the Washington intelligence community. The twice-weekly CIA-Commonwealth briefings are very useful, but the Five Eyes provides greater depth. She added that intelligence reports go to the PM’s office, who “”absorbs”” the paper. A/S Fort explained that the State INR Bureau is relatively small, and therefore focuses on core issues. Currently, Washington policymakers are focused on the longer term implications of the recent Russia/Georgia conflict and what is holds for Russia’s future and adherence to international norms. With North Korea, the Six Party Talks are the central issue, but also Kim Jong Il’s health and possible successor. Afghanistan’s trend lines are worrisome, he added, particularly due to the link with the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan. Pakistan’s transition to civilian leadership is being watched closely in Washington, noted the A/S. He and Forsyth discussed Iranian nuclear pretensions and possible Israeli reaction. A/S Fort offered that Israel is likely to strike if the government of Israel believes Iran has met their red lines; an Israeli strike against Iran would be more complex than those launched against Iraq and Syria, he said. A/S Fort added that the US-India nuclear deal was an historic diplomatic achievement for the Secretary. Responding to Forsyth’s question, Fort downplayed Venezuela as a threat to USG interests and characterized Chavez as more of an annoyance with limited political influence within the region. 8. (S) Forsyth praised the US-New Zealand bilateral

relationship, noting that the highlight of the year had been the Secretary’s visit to New Zealand and onward travel to Samoa, which had provided a window into the challenges facing the Pacific, particularly to the micro-states of the region. New Zealand views the situation in Fiji as “”acute,”” and appreciates USG support for the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) position on Fiji. A/S Fort commented that GNZ sigint had been critical to USG understanding of the 2006 coup. Forsyth offered that New Zealand sees an arc of instability in Melanesia, as there is a great deal of money but little to no capacity to use it wisely. The Solomon Islands are under control at the moment but there are still significant problems in terms of governance and corruption. The GNZ is weighing the necessary structural changes needed to make a long-lasting improvement in the SI society so that RAMSI security forces might depart. Vanuatu is coping for the moment, she added, and New Zealand is putting significant assistance towards agricultural projects there. 9. (S/NF) Moving to North Korea, Forsyth asked if the stalled progress on the Six Party Talks was linked to a DPRK assessment that the U.S. election aftermath might offer a better deal. A/S Fort replied in the negative, noting that foreign policy continuity is the norm. Oscillation is part of the DPRK strategy, he added, and the current situation is complicated by Kim Jong Il’s health issues and the succession process. Kim Jong Il played off the former Soviet Union and China to his benefit and may be trying to use the U.S. in the same way as the Soviets. China’s role has been constructive, continued Fort, largely because Beijing does not want to see a nuclear Korean peninsula and the ramifications of a northeast Asian arms race. The A/S mentioned that North Korea faces a food crisis despite World Food Program assistance. Forsyth said that the New Zealand high commissioner in Seoul would be going soon to North Korea for a periodic visit. 10. (S/NF) The MFAT

Deputy Secretary asked for A/S Fort’s assessment of Afghanistan and Pakistan. New Zealand has troops stationed in Bamiyan province and the GNZ is concerned over the malevolent influence from the tribal areas of Pakistan, particularly since the international community has been trying to transform Afghanistan into a state since 2001. Fort responded that Afghanistan will be an enduring challenge for generations requiring cultural changes. The U.S. is determined to be more aggressive in addressing Taliban cross-border operations, and is weighing the political costs with Pakistan. Forsyth and Fort discussed prospects for the Indian government to improve its relations with Islamabad to ease pressure on the Pakistan army to fight insurgents in the FATA. Comment ——- 11. (C) GNZ interlocutors were pleased to have the opportunity to discuss a range of global issues of bilateral concern. All meetings focused on GNZ support for the intelligence sharing partnership and, in particular, the singular role of Prime Minister Clark in ensuring good cooperation. As of this writing, the New Zealand HC based in Seoul has already returned from her trip to the DPRK; we will try to get a readout from MFAT. End Comment. 12. (U) A/S Fort has cleared this message. MCKEAN”,24/10/2008

Fighting symbolism with symbolism

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So the Crown, having had their appeal against the Waihopai 3’s acquittal (about which Pablo wrote an excellent post) dismissed, is considering a civil case against them, to recover the $1.1 million cost of the damage to the dome and fences surrounding the satellite dish.

In politics it is usually best to fight symbolism with symbolism; once a topic or policy matter is being debated in symbolic terms, in general no amount of fact or logic or reason will prevail against it. This often promotes an arms race — the party to a debate who introduces symbolic aspects to their discourse gets to set the agenda, to define what the debate is about, and this is clearly so with the Waihopai 3. While the customary analysis of the protest action is that it took place one morning in April 2008, with a slight return in the criminal court during March 2010, but all this demonstrates is that people don’t really understand the nature of this protest. It is ongoing. This morning, Peter Murnane responded with some puzzlement to Sean Plunket’s question “Do you have any further protest actions planned?” by saying “No […] well, we’re busy with this one.” That’s the point: Defending their actions on truthful, legitimate and principled grounds in the full glare of public scrutiny is the protest. Contrary to another current case, the Waihopai 3 have stood up and said the non-blasphemous equivalent of “you’re goddamned right I did”, and are willing to accept the consequences of their actions — but only once they’ve made their position clear. And they expect that their commitment to principle and legitimate due process is reciprocated by the Crown, and if sued will call for representatives of the GCSB to face them in court. This places the Crown in an invidious position: it cannot permit senior intelligence and security staff to be dragged into this matter, but if it fails to do so it will cede the symbolic field to Ploughshares, and the legitimacy of its position will be further eroded.

For the Crown to seek reparation would be fair and just: the actions of the Waihopai 3 cost the NZ taxpayer money and the Crown has a right to recover that via legitimate legal means. But because the Waihopai Three have set the terms of the symbolic debate and have everything to gain and nothing whatsoever to lose from the case, it is a fool’s errand. While, as Bill Hodge says, the Crown has an “invincible case” in the civil court, the battle is not being waged in the court, but in people’s hearts and minds. The Waihopai 3 claim they have no money, and this seems plausible. So the only reason for the Crown to take a case against them is to demonstrate that the organs of power are not to be trifled with, and that even if a jury will acquit for a good cause, an appealing idealistic argument, or an integrous and principled stand such actions cannot be undertaken with impunity. A display of power, if you like, though not an especially vulgar one. Such a display may serve the social purpose of quelling the urges of overenthusiastic and legally (not to mention ethically) illiterate anti-abortionists, and will have some currency among the not-so-closeted authoritarians who bayed for the blood of these peaceful protesters in April 2008 and again in March 2010. But to the extent that the government seeks to retain its dignity, this will be cold comfort indeed.

L