Hardly a robust statistical survey, but makes very interesting reading.

Is globalisation the emergence of the cause or the cause of the counter-terrorism emergence?

Communism was fated to fail from the start but it took more than 70 years or 3 generations. The tactics of appeasement and complacency have been shown not to work. The first attack in the world trade centre was 1993. 8 years later the jihadists achieved success. Now is the time to double down and follow McChrystals strategy rather than withdraw.

The world will be a much less safe place over coming decades if the jihadist terrorists are able to claim any defeat of the West.

Obama needs to confront Netanyahu and bring peace to that region or the spectre of terrorism will continue.

Terrorism can be supplanted by ownership of WMD or resort to conventional force (if the western forces left Afghanistan the Taleban would prevail just as the North did when entering Saigon) – unilaterally or multi-laterally.

Terrorism is a declaration of resistance, resistance can continue in rejection of secularism and election of Islamic parties after violent overthrown of established regimes and installation of Islamic republics.

The irony is that it is a supposed fear of this violent overthrow of established regimes or the popularity of Islamist parties which is cited as a security interest (by regimes) in the prevention of democratic reform. And thus fear of the “resistance” prevents democratic secularisation. Maybe the terrorists, Islamists and established regimes need each other to prevent the change which they all fear?

SPC: You are right about Irgun/Stern. I should have said that they played a role “in part” in the creation of Israel.

Matt: Although a few perpetrators may be nihilists I do not believe that politically-motivated terrorism is at its core nihilistic.

Andrew W: With due respect, saying that “terrorism is political violence that causes terror” is a tautology that is useless, not correct. Parsimony in definition is one thing; crude over-simplification is another. I do agree with the your comment about states manipulating fear to their advantage.

PhilS: I disagree with your opinion that the jihadist objective is to overthrow Western democracies. To the contrary, I believe that is not only an impossible, even ridiculous objective even if it were true, but that in fact the jihadist campaign is overtly defensive in nature. They want to preserve what they see is a cultural belief system under siege, even if they encourage “third column” seditious activity in places ike the UK, France and the Netherlands. (Incidentally, much thanks for the link over at NM)

That brings me to the general point, one that you all have noted: the quote about the last gasp of the dying man is wrong. I guess I should have clarified better in the post why I believe it to be true. Here goes my explanation:

The jihadist cause is doomed to fail because its ideological appeal is waning even in the Muslim world and only finds succor and refuge in failed states that are resource poor and rendered by gross poverty and ignorance, elite corruption, and persistent pre-modern ethno-religious conflicts precisely because they have not been touched by globalisation (due to their unimportance as economic entities). Some of the jihadists may come from elite classes, but the only place they have appeal is amongst the Muslim downtrodden and disaffected minorities in Western states.

Hard core Islamicists are being forced to retreat into these desperate safe havens, where they are being encircled with the purpose of choking their resource flows and re-supply lines. The job of killing them off has a ways to go when in comes to places like Somalia, the Sudan and Pakistan (and Gaza), but the writing is on the wall. In fact, it is only when Islamicists can cloak their objectives in nationalist or tribalist garb (such as in Palestine or in the Hindu Kush) that they continue to maintain some type of popular appeal. But the Wahhabist/Salafist brand of Sunni internationalism is clearly being rolled back along the lines I describe above. Western adherents may be locally dangerous but cannot broaden their appeal. Shiia extremism is mitigated by the fact that it clashes with Sunni interests and has a “return to sender” stamp on it called Iran (which promotes caution in Iranian decision-making when its core state values come into play).

It may not be publicly discussed and is overshadowed by the overt military campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan (and the Philippines), but transnational intelligence sharing and joint covert counter-terrorism operations have increased exponentially in the last five years and have consequently been increasingly successful in early detection and neutralisation of Islamicist cells. This includes intelligence sharing by traditional rivals on matters of mutual counter-terrorism interest, a process that crosses ideological divides and which includes identifying and disrupting Islamicist funding and support networks as well as terrorist cells

As I mention in the post, that in turn has forced the Islamicists to atomise their operations, to the point of using “Lone Wolf” agents that are hard to detect but who generally have much more limited impact in the conduct of their operations (Major Hassan being a case in point).

All of which is to say that even though the struggle is far from over and there will be plenty more terrorist attacks in the near future (as their desperation increases), and that the outcome in failed states (especially Afghanistan and Pakistan) is far from certain, I nevertheless believe that the jihadists have seen the crest of their wave. Their best bet is to revert to localised “reminder” operations that serve notice that they are still capable of inflicting tactical damage in contested spaces. But as a strategic actor projecting influence on the global playing field, they are all but done.

‘We’ were already doing that, and more besides, up to and including taking the fight into countries ruled with popular support. Not to mention providing support for tyrants when it suits us. So we’ve sown dragons’ teeth.

Having said that maybe ‘jihad’ was inevitable anyway. I can’t see a viable military solution, primarily because the soldiers on one side can self-recruit, train themselves (or even get training from their enemy) and act autonomously. Which inevitably brings us back to good policework on the one hand, and looking for better diplomatic and domestic solutions on the other. By all means we can disrupt their support base in the meantime if possible, but we have to bear in mind the collateral damage.

A fascinating post and discussion as usual. I wish I had more time to consider and post more appropriate and well thought responses.

I disagree with the last gasp of a dying man quote but understand why you included it. Gavrip Principio, Eire, Israel, the Boer and any number of other examples during the retreat of the British empire are sufficient to demonstrate the effectiveness of terrorism as a weapon. The point is well made by the Tamils & Al Qaeda in Iraq that when the terrorists turn on their own population rather than the ruling class they are losing.

Andrew W makes a good point that politically weak governments are prone to manipulate the spectre of terrorism for their own ends.

And weak politicians simply choose appeasement over hard decisions. That is what we are seeing with Obama.

I am interested in your views on the Clash of Civilisations. This post is an interesting contextual first chapter but it must be leading somewhere. Personally I see jihadist terrorism as being a multi generational conflict. Until those Islamic nations have developed and educated and prosperous middle class living reasonably democratically there will be no sustained peace. Iraq represented a country much further along that path than Afghanistan which is why it was chosen. Oil and Bush unfinished business with Saddam were not sufficient reasons in and of themselves to justify war. The possibility of WMD being provided to and used by terrorists and the opportunity to provide an example democracy to the rest of the Arab world were the reasons for going into Iraq.

Leaving Afghanistan as the sole front in the war against Jihadist terrorism would mean inevitable defeat due to the nature and backwardness of the country.

imho the jihadists are trying to overthrow our Western democracy and it is legitimate for us to take the fight into countries that are not ruled democratically or at least with popular support.

So I look forward to your next chapter where you develop the clash of civilisations theme, either agreeing or disagreeing or in a different direction.

Well that was sorta the aim, to summarise the core of what I read as your argument in a few words, your labelling it a tautology presumably means I was correct.

My use of the word “perhaps” was not accidental, I’m aware of the apparent contradiction.

“perhaps a better argument for an example of terrorism is states controlling their own people…by creating a fear of that defeat…”. What happened to threat or use of violence as per your definition?

That was put as a suggestion for another perspective, not a conclusion, the threat of violence is advanced by the State, with the enemy as the agent of that violence.

It may not fly as a form of terrorism, but I think it’s interesting in that states do sometimes create fear in their populations by using exaggeration of an external threat as a means of controlling that population.
So the threat of violence to create fear to advance a political ends is there.

As for your remark about disloyal opposition and Obama’s electoral chances, you are reading way too much into my post. Try to stay on topic.

It was a question Pablo, I take it your answer is no.

“terrorism is the last desperate gasp of a dying man. The cause is lost, its ideological appeal is on the wane, and thus the zealots respond by desperate acts of wanton mayhem in a last ditch effort to rattle the nerves of the subject and erode his will to continue to push his agenda to completion.”

I’m surprised you give such importance to this quote, given that it obviously is contradicted by many of the examples of terrorism you give, as you illustrate, terrorism has been part of many successful campaigns.

In all cases terrorism is by definition a criminal act, but its strategic utility varies according to prospects of its objective(s) being achieved.

I don’t buy that, I assume by “criminal act” you mean that acts of terrorism contravene international law, I think that’s putting the cart in front of the horse. if the law were changed to allow terrorism by some nations, as it appears to already – by the definition I used above – would you then argue that “the use or threat of use of violence to create terror in the pursuit of a political agenda” was no longer terrorism, because it was no longer a criminal act?

A case in point of much relevance.

The Afghanistan mujahideen could have been seen by some (their Arab allies) as being engaged in a war with a declining (secular) Soviet superpower, and that this engagement was the noblest act of their lives.

Thus Arabs looking for a continuing alliance to engage in a struggle with another secular (or at least non Moslem) superpower. In this being the champions of Islam confronting the non Moslem world.

The regional purpose of which is to mobilise (at least) sentiment in the Islamic world in common cause against the non Moslem “secular world” and to promote resistance to regimes seen as secularising or suppressing Islamic political movements.

Combine that with observing the way the Cold War divided the world between “us and them”, and that then successfully provoking the Americans (after the Cold war ended) would divide the world between those on the side of the Americans or the Islamists – the concept of which would appeal to their religious sense of the militant jihad and their chauvinism in being men of destiny.

To suggest that the resort to terrorism is simply a desperate act is hubris. If the use of terrorism is sufficient to deny victory and peace to the superior conventional force and the superior force is unable to maintain conventional supremay indefinitely, then the ultimate result is unknown. And if the intent of the terrorist is to initially gain in status by denying the superpower conclusive victory, that of itself achieves its goal. The secondary goal then is to either outlast the superpower and or build up support for Islamic resistance to secularism.

A second case in point would be that esablishment power (abuse of power terrorism) is often exercised to provoke dissent – which is then used to identify those who who would dare resist increasing authoritarianism. I would suggest that those who oppose increasing security powers etc (say surveillance) are the first to be so categorised.

PS a quibble – I doubt Irgun or Stern’s existence was required for the state of Israel to establish.

I think there’s a distinction to be made between terrorism as a tool and terrorism as a goal in itself. The terrorism practised by Al Quaeda, for example, masquerades as strategy (insofar as it has a philosophy), and has allied itself with criminal elements in Afghanistan etc, but its source is (among other places) in Egyptian torture chambers (terrorist structures themselves), and its goal is revenge. The terrorism practised by the Taliban on the other hand is about money, power and land.

In that measure I would say that the jihadists are losing, which is what prompted me to open the post with the quote from a veteran SOLIC professional. However, when it comes to the likes of Pakistan, the Sudan or Afghanistan, then the issue remains very much open.

In all cases terrorism is by definition a criminal act, but its strategic utility varies according to prospects of its objective(s) being achieved.

Allied fire and nuclear bombing of civilian population centres could well have been criminal, but it had strategic utility. Japanese massacres of Chinese, Filipino, and Korean populations did not, not because they were criminal but because they did not achieve the desired objective. In that sense, to the victors go the spoils (and the writing of history).

So then the distinction is between military action and criminal terrorism. Good point, but doesn’t that render the strategic utility question moot, if terrorism is by definition a criminal act?

I would simply note that, with the exception of criminal terrorism, in all cases the justification for terrorism is ideological, which in turn defines the strategic goals that terrorism, as a tactic, wishes to advance.

This discussion has a natural follow up in the debate about trying the Guantanamo 4 (9/11 conspirators) in US federal court in NYC. Although it may seem contradictory in light of the discussion above, I am all for it, but it seems that many (mostly right-conservative) commentators do not have the same faith in the US justice system that I do and want them to be tried in those special military tribunals.

I believe that political motivated violence can be handled by criminal law frameworks in democracies and do not have to be awarded a special status that requires separate forms of adjudication. That only reifies the terrorist cause.

It would be also interesting to hear what readers feel about the Urewera 17 in light of this discussion.

My contention is that the motivating factors behind state repression and individual terrorist acts are completely different. One is an act perpetrated by an established order – the knock on the door at 2am for example. The other is an act, purportedly against the established order, which often in fact has far more to do with the psychology of a few teenage males (that’s the short version). Certainly these individuals can be manipulated by external forces, but their influences are unpredictable at best. The ‘Terrorist State’ is far better compared with a large criminal organisation than a terrorist cell. Certainly both will commit atrocities, but if the result defines the purpose, then all violence is terrorism, and the definition becomes meaningless.

In a way, discussions of 4th generation warfare are of the “back to the future” type, since it returns to the 1st generation concepts of fluidity, deception and misdirection that Tsun Tsu so aptly described (and I agree that he is the father of asymmetric warfare).

When I said state terrorism – or tyranny – ‘involves turning on your neighbours’ I didn’t mean neighbouring countries, though it often involves that too. But I think you probably understand that better than I do.

As for state versus non-state terrorism, I make distinctions between several types of terrorism in the post (to include state sponsored as well as the above), so can only refer you back to it. I will say, having lived under two state terrorist regimes (Argentina and Chile), that states are quite effective at terrorising their populations, and do not always enter into conflict with their neighbours. In fact, as “Operation Condor” in the 1970s shows, state terrorist regimes can cooperate quite well when it comes to destroying their mutual political enemies.

At the ‘home grown’ level, terrorists hope to inspire the general population to their cause. This attempt inevitably fails, and then the terrorists turn upon the people they were hoping to ’save’, seeing emnity in their lack of support. It’s also possible that they just become more comfortable with savagery.