The more economically integrated the two countries become the less likely conflict would be.

I see the NZ approach as similar. Rio Tinto was a loss of face but partly China was simply seeing how far it cold go. They will take any advantage they can where open market ideology allows assets to be sold to China without reciprocal rights.

Absent shared values and with competing interests, yet being individually smaller, the seemingly best option is to solidify Antipodean relations as a united front to Chinese expansionism in the region.

I see it as being less a united front and more of a relationship that needs to be managed to mutual advantage. That has been easier for India with its English speaking recent heritage, but is possible with China.

Should the investments in resource development by China remain unmade? The West has not bothered over decades.

It is not something to be stopped, certainly it is something to be well understood and managed.

Your comment about China is interesting. Anz being in the forefront of limiting Chinese influence at the request of the US makes absolute sense. It explains the thawing from the US towards New Zealand and the strategic approach of Rudd.

I contrast Rio Tinto which was China being strategically refused permission to control resources in Australia and Fonterra. Fonterra was a reputable Western company trying to follow acceptable Chinese channels to eliminate commercially destructive Chinese behaviour. China is smart enough to understand Fonterra NZ was not at fault and it was trying to handle the problem quietly.

Think about the face implications of both on China. Despite the mewing about Fonterra in NZ media I believe Fonterra has increased face in China and that reflects on NZ. Rio Tinto, a massive decrease.

I appreciate the informed responses. You list is a good indicator of the road to be traveled, but the writing is still on the wall (to mix metaphors). In fact, if we add in the Gini coefficient on inequality, then the distance between the advanced industrial democracies and the BRICs is even greater. But since your list has Italy as well as France and Germany ahead of the RIB states, and Spain amongst them, I think that the trend is clear. Lets see where these countries are in a decade.

I suspect that a strengthened NZ-OZ bilateral alliance is in anticipation of the US asking it to be the front line in countering Chinese expansionism in the Southwestern pacific. The NZOZ alliance can better use soft as well as hard power incentives and disincentives to prevent China from disrupting the pro-Western status quo in the region, which otherwise could have serious implications for forms of governance as well as island state approaches to fisheries, whaling and other types of regional resource extraction. Papua New Guinea and the Solomons, for example, have become major focuses of Chinese investment in logging, which has contributed not only to unchecked deforestation but to political instability as well due to the disruptive influence of Chinese money on local politics.

Given the Rio Tinto and Fonterra debacles in China, to say nothing of its intelligence gathering activities in both OZ and NZ and its growing military presence off-shore, Rudd and Key are increasingly aware of the downside of a full embrace Pacifika embrace of Chinese power. Absent shared values and with competing interests, yet being individually smaller, the seemingly best option is to solidify Antipodean relations as a united front to Chinese expansionism in the region. Or so it seems from recent events.

I have been thinking for the past few days of a decent response to Russell Brand and just have to admit defeat. :^)

I live very near Runneymede and used to think the British stood for democracy and freedom but you are right this is a country in decline with the exception of London financial power due to Sarbanes Oxley. HSBC is based in UK not Hong Kong or Shanghai.
Actually my comparison of Brazil with Britain and India was simply to point out they are of similar power. They are all Regional powers, nothing more and not likely to be for decades to come. India GDP is less than half UK and one quarter China The wiki list below shows how far Brazil and India have to go up to match Britain on the gentle path down it has been on for the last 60 years.
1 United States 14,264,600
2 Japan 4,923,761
3 People’s Republic of China 4,401,614h
4 Germany 3,667,513
5 France 2,865,737
6 United Kingdom 2,674,085
7 Italy 2,313,893
8 Russia 1,676,586
9 Spain 1,611,767
10 Brazil 1,572,839
11 Canada 1,510,957
12 India 1,209,686

As far as Bush is concerned I admire the intent if not some of the execution. We will agree to disagree about Bush. But it does entertain me to stir you with comparison of your views on foriegn policy to the Busn doctrine. Sorry about that. ;^) strange sense of humour.

We share the view that ALL people in the world have the right to self determination, we just differ about how to get there. To me soveriegnty applies only to those nations who have genuine self determination. I see no reason to protect dictators.

I read Fran O’Sullivan onRudd via kiwiblog and his apparent strategy on getting closer to NZ as part of his strategic analysis of growing Chinese power and would be interested in your views.

It seems there is a lot of sense politically in getting closer to Australia while maintaining the relationship with China.

And while requesting commentary I would also be interested in you relating your scoop democracy analysis to the gradual democratisation of China. There is rule of law and attention to the popular will albeit no vote.

I like your idea of NZ not showing its hand too early, but that is a public diplomacy tactic. Its strategic planners need to be thinking now of where they want NZ to be in 10-25 years vis a vis these players.

At a glance, and again within the limits of a comment, I think we shall see a US-India and India-Russia bilateral containment of China. A US-Brazil axis is already being attempted by the Yanks so as to counter Chinese inroads into LATAM and in particular its relationship with Venezuela. Brazil is happy to run a China-Brazil line so as to off-set US pressure. Russia will want to pursue a US entente to counter China, yet work to be cordial with the Chinese as a counter to the US and its European allies. The point is that a systemic level the situation will be much more fluid and dynamic than during the Cold War or immediate post Cold War eras, as multiple balancing moves and countermoves will keep the system in equilibrated state.

As for the UK decline, I have two words that sum it up: Russell Brand.

Thanks for clarifying your position, I appreciate the constraints of a blog post mean we can’t address everything we would like.

In your opinion, how do you understand the balance of power in a USBRIC world? More specifically, how do you think that the blocs will array against each other militarily, economically and politically?

Closer to home, the questions that arise are as follows: is NZ cognizant of these shifts and does it have a coherent foreign policy and international security strategy to ensure that it can take advantage, or at least not be disadvantaged by them?

I would argue that not having a obvious approach to the new multipolarity is a slight advantage when compared to a country that has obviously signaled its alliances, ie. Australia.
By resisting the temptation to bandwagon, New Zealand can always hold out for the better deal, by playing both ends against the middle.

I disagree with your assessment of the UK. Although an interesting place, it is to my mind a society in terminal decline, culturally, socially, economically and politically.

I know this thread isn’t on the UK, but if you could briefly explain your appraisal I’m sure we would be happy to hear it.

Cheers,

Corey

You will note that the title of the post is the “coming” USBRIC world. The BRICs may not quite be able to fully match the US as of yet, but the trends are clear. I agree that Russia has serious internal issues that could undermine its quest for great power status, as does China for that matter. But none of these should stop their assertion on the world stage over the next 25 years. NZ has to future plan for that.

I disagree with your assessment of the UK. Although an interesting place, it is to my mind a society in terminal decline, culturally, socially, economically and politically. The claim that it is a world financial centre is undermined by the fact that many of its best and brightest financiers have moved to Asia, which is where the big money is.

As for the failures of the Bush 43 administration. Since we have beem through this before, how about we agree to disagree. You see no evil in it, and I think it was an unmitigated disaster that directly precipitated the US decline.

Pablo – I respect your political analysis but this description of relative economic power and blaming Bush leaves a lot to be desired. B and I economic and thus political military power is frankly a joke. Russia has economic influence over Western Europe through gas ransom, and military power through the now unlikely threat of MAD from ageing warheads. Both are long term unsustainable as the Russian population ages and reduces and its gas runs out. Brazil and India are mid size. Britain is and will remain more powerful than either with its military tradition and London’s position as financial centre of Europe and arguably the world.

China has economic mutual assured destruction through its US Treasury holdings and dependence on exports to the US in the short to medium term. Chinese growth has been greater than US for decades and will continue so. But America will maintain a technology lead despite the per capita GDP and total GDP gap narrowing. It remains able to buy the best brains and offer them the quality of life that China will remain incapable of.

Long term the balance of power remains bipolar. New Zealand is well placed as a interlocuter trusted and respected by both sides. You wish to be non partisan, then try taking a little more open view towards Bush & National

I appreciate your critical scrutiny. Within the confines of a blog post (which was already going to be long), I had to make some analytic distinctions. Thus, although I agree that we will see a more vigorous Japanese international security posture in the future, I do not see it achieving the status of the BRICs. As you said, demographics and stagnation conspire against it, and any move to assert ties with Taiwan or adopt an aggressive (offensive) military posture will find a united negative response from the rest of the East and Southeast Asian states. Memories linger…so the best that Japan can do is reinforce its alliance with the US and try to forge ties with Brazil (which has a large Nissei community).

As for the EU I do not see it anywhere close to emerging as a distinct political-military entity, even with the threat of a re-emergent Russia on its eastern flank. Besides the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment and conservative nationalist backlash against “Europeanising” efforts, there is appreciable differences of opinion and approach towards Russia on the part of “new” and “old” Europe, particularly along the Slavic/Anglo-Saxon/Latin/Germanic divides. For all the laudable attempts at regional integration, between the ongoing existence of traditional differences and parochial concerns, coupled with the difficulties in assimilating former Eastern European countries and the social dislocations caused by tides of extra-regional immigration, the EU cannot come anywhere close to developing a coherent strategic posture, much less project economic and military power world-wide. Individual European companies may have global economic clout; individual European countries may have global diplomatic leverage; but as the travails as the NATO led ISAF mission in Afghanistan proves, it is incapable of imposing on its own a preferential solution to intractable foreign problems. For that it needs other powers–the US today, the BRICs tomorrow.

I am going to have to map out the multipolar constellations that might conceivably emerge in a USBRIC dominated world. But suffice it to say that I believe that Japan and the EU will be like moons orbiting the USBRIC planets, subject to the gravitational pull between them. They in turn will have their respective clients and dependencies, much as asteroid belts surround moons in any given solar system. The one I am outlining is defined by USBRIC.

I enjoyed your analysis, but I feel that there are several important actors notable by their absence: specifically, Japan and the European Union.

Do you think that the mentioned economic, demographic and social differences will continue to preclude a unified Europe? I know moves towards greater integration have been obstructed of late, but in light of a re-emerging Russia, do you think the Europeans will be able to put their differences aside?

Also, Japan. While in demographic decline and relative economic stagnation, it is still a force to be reckoned with. I would wager an increase on the (official) 1% defence spending limit within the next 15 years, to maintain their qualitative edge in the region. And while I’m speculating wildly, I wouldn’t put it past the Japanese to re-forge those old links with Taiwan to contain PRC adventurism.

I’ll leave it at that for now, I don’t want to hijack this thread any further and detract from the questions in your final paragraph.