Already the Army is at its very limit with the current deployments it supports. And frankly there is nothing that could be done in the short term to change this bar withdrawing from the mess that we know as East Timor.

Lets briefly consider the merits of that though. 10 years later and there has been almost no progress in that country despite the millions New Zealand has poured into it via numerous deployments and monetary aide, let alone the billions poured in by others. And lets not get started on the staggering amount of money Timor has earned from oil and gas but still refuses to do anything with except bank !

My point is this – regardless of your opinion on the suitability and role of deploying the LAV, or for that matter the SAS again, it is simply not sustainable in any measure unless something else gives. And for those who believe a Defence budgetary increase in this current fiscal environment is realistic, you are misguided. There are far greater priorities here in New Zealand even if the money was available.

Anyway, aside from the fact the it takes a considerable number of years to grow additional units that are capable of undertaking missions abroad, let me repeat myself, the money is just not going to be available.

Finally, it all sounds very noble to call for an increased commitment to somewehre like Afghanistan, but to do so from the quite comfort of your computer when it is someone else that will actually have to undertake that difficult task, well there is a word that sums people like that up quite well. I will leave it to your imagination. If I come across as being disdainful of arm chair warriors – I make no apologies.

Leave calls for increasing operational commitments to people who know what they are talking about.

The UK needs the rest of Europe economically a lot more than Europe needs them. Foreign military intervention is somewhat unpopular in Western Europe – several governments lost power as a result of their deployment of troops into Iraq, for instance. European nations’ security would probably be better served if NATO reverted to it’s old “tripwire” role of defending the territorial integrity of its members, which it was pretty good at.

IMHO, of course.

The Afghans would no doubt be better off with a liberal democratic government. So indeed would many states in the developing world. But it’s for them to make their own way, not for the West to impose its values by military force.

New Zealand’s defence policy should be based primarily on the defence of these islands, not supporting the colonial adventures of the US.

Reid is right in his assessment that NZ needs to be creative and bring more to the table, as in MFAT, etc. (I would keep the SIS out of it not only because such operations is outside of its purview or capabilities–do we really think that the SIS has specialists in Afghani politics and society?– but because it continues to demonstrate a lack of professional development that would be embarrassing to reveal to outsiders).

That is because the strategy in Afghanistan needs to be two-pronged, each strand run in parallel: One prong is the military counter-offensive against the Taleban. As most revolutionary socialists understand, intractable retrogrades need to be removed from the equation before the political solution can be found. This ISAF effort in Afghanistan could, if successful, be revolutionary for Afghans, let there be no doubt about that. Whether the outcome is socialist is less important than that the domestic sources of oppression be liquidated. Even if that leaves residual vestiges of primordial irrationality (religion and tribalism), it is a step forward. The NZSAS has a role to play on this front, which is to remove the armed strength of the primordial oppressors. They may be fulfilling that role already, and if so, that should be welcomed.

But for a better Afghan future (said in modernist terms) to happen, there needs to be a comprehensive UN led nation-building effort in the country, and that goes far beyond the ISAF mission. The beginnings of that project are already in place, but there is need for greater international commitment to the cause. NZ can play a greate role there as well.

To which I say again: where are the Russians in this? Surely they are not so weak that they cannot afford to look beyond their immediate borders to see what the withdrawal of ISAF and return of the Taliban mean for Central Asia as a whole, and by proximinal implication, themselves?

Enough for now. Thanks for the discussion.

Don’t you think there are many genuine bad guys in Afghanistan that really won’t respond to anything other than the sort of treatment that only the special forces can met out?

Why would doing that undermine the hearts and minds campaign? They are two separate campaigns, aimed at entirely different customers.

The problem is, if Nato’s in charge, the commonwealth countries aren’t.

I quite agree Pablo that NZ needs to pull more weight and indeed I believe we need to pull as much weight as we reasonably can in these straightened economic circumstances, to make up for lost time since 1984 when we abrogated our international responsibilities and dropped the yoke of righteous obligation which forced other nations to assume those responsibilities that really were ours. In other words, we’ve been shirking for all that time. That may or may not be your view but it is mine.

However while I believe in obligation I also believe in effectiveness and that is really the key here: what is the most effective ‘bang-for-buck.’ NZers can be quite effective in extracting that, but only if we’re allowed to play the game our way. Our way is not the Nato way.

Because we’re so small, in addition to the military solutions offered above, I’d also like to see significant resources thrown into Afghanistan from MFAT, SIS, Crown Minerals, Treasury, MED and other state agencies capable of educating the Afghans in nation building.

I think there’s a lot of value we can offer beyond bricks and mortar, that will go a long way, on the principle of teach a man to fish. We just don’t have the resources to make a significant difference, using only the military.

One of the reasons I think that the NZDF can expand its contribution is that it has a good track record of doing non-combat “hearts and minds” operations (such as with the Bamyan PRT), but also has a good combat force in the form of the NZSAS. Adding the latter, or contributing an artillery battery, requires relatively few troops but can have a significant impact if discretely applied.

What would you see the SAS doing that wouldn’t undermine the kinds of “hearts and minds” approach that NZ has been doing in Bamyan? I can see some value in having troops to ensure that the PRT is safe and the locals they’re working with are safe. But is that what they’d be doing?

By an improvement in their lives I mean the projects undertaken by the NZ Provincial Reconstruction team funded by the NZ taxpayer such as:

The completion of 20 new village wells.
The building and opening of five new police stations
The building of five new flood protection walls.
Supplying and setting up new generators for Bamyan Hospital and University.
Supplying and instructing in the use of defibrillators to Bamyan hospital.
The repair and building of various key bridges and roads in the Banyan region to ensure a reliable delivery of aid, access to medical services and transport links with the rest of Afghanistan.
Building a new ward and supplying additional surgical equipment to Bamyan Hospital.
Construction and opening of Bamyan boys school.
Setting up water reticulation schemes.
Providing advise and basic items like office furniture, stationary etc to the new regional administration.

The list goes on and on. These are the projects, items and actions which will in the long term defeat jihadism and the things which allow it to grow: poverty, lack of education and despair.
The Afghans don’t need more men with guns. They need more hope. The NZ Army is doing that. Leave them to it.

One of the reasons I think that the NZDF can expand its contribution is that it has a good track record of doing non-combat “hearts and minds” operations (such as with the Bamyan PRT), but also has a good combat force in the form of the NZSAS. Adding the latter, or contributing an artillery battery, requires relatively few troops but can have a significant impact if discretely applied. The main thrust of NZDF operations can remain focused on peacekeeping and nation-building.

The point being that it is not just the size of the force being used that matters–it is the way in which it is used. It is here where I believe NZ has something to contribute.

Pablo’s post on the case for increasing our military involvement in Afghanistan. Pablo argues the military involvement there is justified by reference to liberal, democratic values and the UN’s new concept of ‘responsibility to protect’. Being …

Will continued military intervention in Afghanistan make the difference that needs to be made?

One of my big concerns with the current plan is that I just can’t see it working. The presence of large very foreign military forces seems so likely to strengthen the government’s opponents (Taleban and other).

I agree that currently the NZDF has limited capacity to expand its operations in Afghanistan (beyond the SAS) and that the lower western Pacific basin should be a priority area. However, my purpose in writing the post was to help generate some debate about our strategic priorities and how to engage them (from a centre-left perspective). On that score I would argue that Afghanistan and Pakistan are the central fronts in the struggle between civilised secularism and an expansionist, retrograde armed theological authoritarianism (understanding that I do not have much regard for any organised religion but see this particular struggle in modern geostrategic terms). My support for an expanded NZDF role takes into account the obvious failures of the Karzai (and Pakistani) regimes, the issues of opium trading, and the grave command failures in theater. I am aware of Afghanistan’s local history and record vis a vis foreign occupiers. I understand the need for more carrots (hearts and minds operations) and less sticks (kinetic operations), and the extreme difficulties of winning over the support of a hostile local population by foreign occupying troops when traditional power structures are opposed to that (my take on hearts and minds is most informed by Mao in his “On Protracted War,” especially his sections on the non-combat roles of the People’s Popular Army–but even then he was working with co-nationals).

That is why I see this as a make or break conflict, and therefore crucial to international peace and security. NZ has a strategic interest in seeing the ISAF mission succeed, even if the solution set is far from ideal.

Although the danger of failed states and low intensity conflicts in the southwestern Pacific basin are clear, as is the regional expansion of Chinese influence and power (both hard and soft), the gravest threat to the international community is in south central Asia. Thus the need to direct resources towards that conflict as a priority over others. It is a hard choice for resource-strapped countries like NZ, but it has to be done because the stakes are so high. Thus smart decisions need to be made about how to prioritise amongst competing strategic necessities.

That brings up my other (implicit) point: we need to have a robust debate on NZ defense expenditures and force configuration in light of current and future projected strategic realities. One of those realities is that the demand for multinational armed intervention in Low Intensity Conflicts will increase in the near future, be it for conflict resolution, peacekeeping or nation-building purposes. The NZDF has, and can enlarge its mix of combat and non-combat roles in such scenarios IF the government and public agree to increase expenditures on externally-oriented defense requirements (I am opposed to large increases in internal security budgets because I do not think that they are warranted). But that implies a public discussion of NZ’s role–specifically its armed role–in the international community. Hence my post, with the ensuing discussion here and elsewhere providing a good first start in raising the issue in the public domain, keeping in mind that politicians tend to follow rather than lead such public discussions.

However, there is fundamental resistance to eradicating the Opium cultivation in Afghanistan. While it continues to be produced and sold, the country will never be properly brought under the control of the government, as it continues to fund independence and resistance. Therefore, once Afghanistan become less geo-politically important, it will simply revert back to what it was prior to intervention.

I think that while New Zealand has made an invaluable contribution, as a small industrial country we should not be carrying a burden that other more localized states are avoiding. Weapons are reportedly being smuggled in from Iran, and like you suggest, Pakistan is not doing as much as it can to intervene. At some stage we have to stand up and say that as an international actor we are very active, but the costs to us out weight the benefits.

The Pacific would benefit more substantially from our proactive engagement, especially throughout Melanesia, where we have definitive security goals and are subject to the insecurity and instability that is present. A conflict, such as the Bougainville civil, is far more deserving of our attention.

Hillary is going to use “Smart Power” – a politically correct combination of soft power and hard power. Sounds very blairish.

The other unstated reason that new Zealand should add further troops to ISAF as well as the moral imperative is the realpolitik jumping on the Obama bandwagon. He has endorsed more troops in Afghanistan so it must be right.

The only thing I am curious about Pablo is whether you applied your morality to the govt of Saddam & sons. They were equally illegitimate.

I disagree that Afganistan was a failed state pre-Taleban (at least of one goes back 15 years prior to Taleban rule). It was not a good state by any means but it did have a Communist government/Soviet ally-proxy in the late 1970s that had some success in instituting secular beliefs and socio-economic stability in major commercial centres while it slowly sought to extend its influence into the tribal hinterlands. It was its US and Pakistan-backed overthrow that precipitated the Soviet invasion, which elicited US support for the Taleban as an armed opposition resistance force (including military and para-military training and equipment). In other words, frontline Cold War security politics have now come home to roost, but it is no longer a matter for the US alone to resolve. It is now an international problem, hence the question about NZ’s role.

One has to wonder why the Russians are not involved in the ISAF mission against their old enemies. Do they fear NATO more or are they still licking their Taleban-inflicted wounds? However, that is the subject of another thread…

They were the beneficiaries of it.

The growth of the Taliban came about as a reaction to the fact that there was no state, just a bunch of competing warlords vying for supremacy. The Islamic schools were one of the few institutions left standing and came complete with an explanation for the country’s problems (not being Islamic enough) and a solution that resonated with the locals (sharia).